

## All Recommendations

Thursday, October 04, 2012 6:41:25 AM

Record #	ABU	Unit	I/R	Item Nbr	Additional Consideration (Recommendation)	ABU Proposal	Resolution	Verifier Comments	Verifier Name	Verified On	Due Date	RR	SOE	Assigned To	Status
	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation												
16409	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	32a	Consider changing the classification of the block and check valves to the higher pipe class – Y1 (KR4)	Determine if the current location of the spec break at the nitrogen drop out spool on the reactor R-1310 inlet line (see P&ID D324318-14) meets the current refinery guidance for piping class changes and make a recommendation for modification if appropriate.	There is already a procedure that addresses the removal of the turnout spool at the appropriate time. Talking with Joe Palinkas, if the procedure is followed correctly, there should be no issue. The assumption that the procedure is followed is a basic assumption, and should be relied upon. No need to move the pipe spec break upstream of the check valve.	The pipe class is in the appropriate location.	Sohnrey, Raymond H.	7/3/2007	7/1/2007	4	S	Zayouna, Duraïd	Completed
16410	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	2	Determine if nitrogen blanketing on feed tanks would be appropriate to reduce the possibility of plugging	Review the current feed tank(s) configuration and, if there is no nitrogen blanketing, determine if it would be beneficial to add nitrogen blanketing to minimize the potential for plugging	The P&IDs show nitrogen manifolds going to all three LNF feed tanks (T-3160/3161/3162). B&S confirmed that these tanks receive a nitrogen blanket at all times. Therefore, if plugging is occurring in R-1310/11 and associated effluent lines, the blockage is not coming from the physical degradation of waxy lube oil stocks in the feed tanks. More likely sources of blockage include catalyst fines, corrosion products, and debris left over from turnarounds (nuts, bolts, earplugs).	I agree with the resloution.	Christensen, Keith	7/30/2007	9/1/2007	4	O	Siebert, Matthew J.	Completed
16411	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	8	Review the set point for R-1310 reactor quench line temperature alarm – it may be set too high. R1310 is set at 825degF	Review the R-1310 quench temperature alarms (83TC153 and 83TC163) set point to determine the correct setting for current operation and change if needed	These points are not alarmed. Reactor is alarmed for high bed and skin temp per best practice recommendations.	These points are not alarmed. Reactor is alarmed for high bed and skin temp per best practice recommendations.	Gonzalez, Mauricio E.	6/12/2007	4/28/2007	4	S	Gonzalez, Mauricio E.	Completed

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16412	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	10	Review the set point for the reactor quench line temperature alarm – it may be set too high. R1311 is set at 650 degF	Review the R-1311 quench temperature alarms (83TC229 and 83TC239) set point to determine the correct setting for current operation and change if needed	These points are not alarmed. Reactor is alarmed for high bed and skin temp per best practice recommendations.	These points are not alarmed. Reactor is alarmed for high bed and skin temp per best practice recommendations.	Gonzalez, Mauricio E.	6/12/2007	4/28/2007	5	S	Gonzalez, Mauricio E.	Completed
16413	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	1	Revise P&ID D324334-16 to show correct routing and control of sour water from V-1310 and V-1320. Sour water is no longer connected to V-1453	Review the piping in the field and mark up a copy of P&ID D324334-16 and other affected P&IDs to show the actual routing of the sour water piping from the separators to its destination. Send the mark up to drafting for updating and publishing to the refinery web	P&IDs were marked up and sent to Todd Vasilovich.	I confirm that the drawings were marked up and sent to drafting for re-issue.	Schnrey, Raymond H.	7/16/2007	7/1/2007	5	O	Zayouna, Duraïd	Completed
16414	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	28a	Concern is that the PHA team may not have clear guidance or expertise on the appropriate location of piping classification changes  Consider using a different method for reviewing the locations of piping class changes in the existing plants or bringing in additional personnel (inspection, materials engineer, senior engineer) for the pipe class change location review.	Determine if the current location of the spec break at the level control valves (83LV383A/B) on the sour water from the bottom of the High Pressure Separator V-1310 (see P&ID D324321-16) meets the current refinery guidance for piping class changes and make a recommendation for modification if appropriate.	For this situation, if flow is established, the pressure we will see downstream of the two control valves should be around 100 psi, therefore, there is no reason to change the spec break location (AF4 = 300# spec). In case someone blocks a valve on the sour water line at the boundary limit, there is a PSV on the line inside the boundary limit (PSV13416). The PSV is set to 650psig, which is less than the design pressure of AF4 class of 740 psig. Again, for a blocked valve scenario, there is no need to change the location of the spec break.	The line is protected by a PRD that is set to lift at 650 psig	Schnrey, Raymond H.	7/3/2007	7/1/2007	5	S	Zayouna, Duraïd	Completed
16416	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	1	Revise the P&ID D327798-10 to clarify the piping to individual burners from the two fuel gas headers - especially the connection to burner #3	Review furnace fuel gas piping arrangement in field and mark up a copy of the P&ID D327798-10 for drafting to update drawing to clearly show how primary and secondary burner piping is configured	Verified with Operators and updated the P&ID and sent it to Todd Vasilovich. Created MOC 17240 to update P&ID.	I that the drawings have been marked up correctly and sent to drafting for re-issue .	Schnrey, Raymond H.	7/16/2007	7/1/2007	4	S	Zayouna, Duraïd	Completed

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16417	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	1	Consider re-creating the full time EOM writer position or establishing some process for keeping the EOMs current and accurate	Review the status of the EOMs for the the LNF and other Hydroprocessing units and determine if additional resources are needed to keep the manuals up to date. Then determine a method to obtain the appropriate resources. If there is not a sufficient need for a full time procedure writer, evaluate the possibility of sharing resources within the ABU or with other ABUs.	For new projects, the EOM and procedures will be updated by the Operations representative on the project. For minor projects, the EOM and procedures will be updated by the Area Trainer. There is a process for reviewing procedures routinely and this should ensure that they are maintained up to date. The process for ensuring that the current EOM is up to date is probably best handled as a special assignment person and there is an opportunity for accomplishing this in the short term.	discussed with area trainer	Chavda, Bharat		7/1/2007	4	O	Chavda, Bharat	N/A

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16418	RLOP	LNF	2nd Revalidation	2	Consider establishing a routine scheduled Preventive Maintenance program to make sure the doors close properly at all times	Determine the appropriate method/frequency for routine regular maintenance to keep the doors working smoothly and closing completely	After conferring with William Iversen (Maintenance Supervisor who arranges repairs for these doors), it seems that these doors do not malfunction very often. When they malfunction, a repair crew is scheduled relatively quickly. There are four doors for the Hydro Control Center Building. If one of them malfunctions, that door needs to be forced shut instead of open. When operators open the door, then there is an opportunity for outside environments to move into the building in case of a release. If the door is forced shut, there are three more doors that could be used until that particular door is repaired. In addition, William Iversen is looking into installing heavy duty doors for the outside doors as well, thus providing double protection in case of inside door malfunction. For all the above reasons, it seems that a routine maintenance task is unnecessary for this situation.	The comment about installing heavier outside doors does not correct the problem. The outside walls that those lighter weight doors penetrate are not built to the same structural integrity as the main building that the blast doors are installed in. Rather than a routine maintenance program maybe we look into getting a more reliable mechanical opener that uses an sensor to open the door as opposed to a mechanical latch	Sohnrey, Raymond H.	7/10/2007	7/1/2007	4	5	Zayouna, Duraïd	Completed

Totals: 9 Records